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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jessica  Ibarra  contends  the  district  court  made  two errors  in  this  case.   First,  in  Docket
Number 44949, she contends the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress.
Ms. Ibarra was unlawfully restrained by jail officials.  During the unlawful restraint, she retained
a right to privacy.  As such, she did not lose her ability to challenge the subsequent seizure of an
item she discarded while unlawfully restrained, and the evidence resulting from the search of that
item should have been suppressed.  Second, Ms. Ibarra contends the district court abused its
discretion by imposing excessive sentences in both cases on appeal.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the order denying her motion to suppress and
reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate, or alternatively, remand these cases for new
sentencing hearings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Ibarra had been arrested for possession of a controlled substance and possession of
drug paraphernalia after she admitted ownership of items which police had found in the car in
which she had been riding (Docket Number 44948, hereinafter, the “possession” case).  (See
R., pp.7-8.)  She was booked into the county jail, at which time, she was strip searched, required
to squat and cough, and subjected to a dog sniff.  (R., pp.126-27.)  No contraband was found at
that time.  (R., p.127.)  Two days later, a second dog sniff was conducted in her cell, and no
contraband was found at that time either.  (R., p.127.)
A few days later, officers received a tip from another inmate that Ms. Ibarra might have
contraband.  (See Defense Exhibit A (video of interrogation of Ms. Ibarra); see also Tr., Vol.1,
2p.11, Ls.3-20 (defense counsel noting problems with the informant’s veracity)1; Defense Exhibit
B (the register of actions for the informant’s cases).)  Officers entered Ms. Ibarra’s cell and
apparently saw Ms. Ibarra stick her hands down her pants, which they felt meant she had put
something in her vagina.2  (See R., p.127; Defense Exhibit A (an officer making general
assertions about what happened in the cell  during his interrogation of Ms. Ibarra).)   Ms. Ibarra
asserted she had no contraband in her hand at that time, and a search of her cell revealed no
contraband.  (R., p.127.)
1 The transcripts in this case are provided in three independently bound volumes.  To avoid
confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the hearing on the motion
to suppress held on November 21, 2016.  “Vol.2” will refer to the volume containing the
transcript of the change of plea hearing held on December 2, 2017.  “Vol.3” will refer to the
volume containing the transcript of the sentencing hearing held on March 6, 2017, and it is
consecutively paginated with Vol.2.
2The evidence proffered to the district court while the motion to suppress was being considered
included only a general reference to the events leading up to the searches of Ms. Ibarra on the
day in question.  (See generally Defense Exhibits A-B; Tr., Vol.1.)  However, in their briefs on
the  motion,  both  Ms.  Ibarra  and  the  prosecutor  acknowledged  more  specific  assertions  of  fact
about those events from the officer’s report.  (See R., pp.102-07, 135-38.)  The officer who
testified at the motion to suppress hearing did not offer testimony about those facts despite
having been involved in those events.  (See generally Tr., Vol.1, pp.14-27; compare R., p.68
(affidavit of probable cause filed in support of the initial complaint).)  “[I]t would be improper to
consider these facts on appeal as they were not presented to the district court at the time the
motion to suppress was being considered.” State v. Smith, ___ P.3d ___, 2017 WL 5244262, *5
n.6 (Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2017), petition for review pending; accord State v. Babb, 136 Idaho 95,
97 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the district court improperly relied on assertions of fact in the
prosecutor’s brief which had not actually been proved by the evidence offered in regard to the
motion to suppress).
However, out of candor, Ms. Ibarra acknowledges those more-specific assertions of fact
on appeal.  For example, the probable cause affidavit asserted that the tip specifically identified
Ms. Ibarra and two other inmates as having methamphetamine on the unit.  (R., p.68.)  It alleged
that, when officers entered Ms. Ibarra’s cell, she appeared to have something in her hand and that
she put her hands inside her pants.  (R., p.68.)  It asserted that, when officers ultimately secured
her hands, there was nothing in them, but they purportedly smelled of vaginal fluid.  (R., p.68;
but see R., p.104 n.2 (defense counsel noting the report gave no explanation of the basis for that
conclusion).)
3Officers removed Ms. Ibarra and two other inmates also suspected of possessing
contraband from the unit in order to conduct searches of their persons.  (See R., pp.127-28.)  The
other two inmates were strip searched, and when they asked, were allowed to go to the bathroom
in a toilet with the plumbing shut off.  (R., 128.)  When officers found no contraband on them,
the other two inmates were allowed to return to the unit.  (R., p.128.)
Ms. Ibarra was also strip searched, and no contraband was found.  (R., pp.127-28;
Tr., Vol.1, p.26, Ls.7-9.)  However, when she asked permission to go to the bathroom, her
request was denied, purportedly because officers were waiting on a warrant to conduct a body
cavity search.3  (R., p.129.)  After some time,4 she was ultimately allowed to go to the bathroom,
but rather than being allowed to use a proper toilet, she was required to use a “port-a-toilet”
consisting of a toilet seat placed over a biohazard bag.  (R., p.129; Tr., Vol.1, p.26, Ls.10-12.)
Ms. Ibarra described that process as “degrading, humiliating, and unsanitary.”  (R., p.129.)  Her
waste was examined, and still, no contraband was found.  (R., p.129.) As one officer admitted, at
that point, they had done everything they could without seeking a warrant.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.41,
Ls.2-6.)
Nevertheless, officers continued to keep Ms. Ibarra in handcuffs.  (R., pp.129-30.)  She
asserted the way in which she was handcuffed aggravated the documented issues with her back.
(R., p.128.)  The officers also interrogated her even though she had already clearly requested to
3 No evidence  or  testimony was  offered  to  show that  the  officers  had  actually  made  efforts  to
secure a body-cavity search warrant.  (See generally R., Tr. Vol.1.)  Trial counsel also argued
they would not have actually been able to get a warrant because, in light of the fact that none of
their other searches of Ms. Ibarra had uncovered any contraband, they could not have shown that
probable cause continued to exist at that point.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.37, L.18 - p.38, L.20.)
4 The timeline is not particularly clear, as, according to the officer, Ms. Ibarra was detained on
the day in question for “over two and a half hours approximately.”  (Tr., Vol.1, p.25, Ls.3-7.)
She was allowed to use the bathroom sometime within the first hour and a half.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.26,
L.19 - p.27, L.3.)
4speak to a lawyer.5  (R., p.129.)  During the unlawful interrogation, one officer again mentioned
the possibility that they could seek a warrant to conduct a body cavity search.  (See Defense
Exhibit A (video of the interrogation); R., p.128 (Ms. Ibarra describing this as a threat to get such
a warrant if she did not cooperate).)
When Ms. Ibarra did not make any admissions in response to their questions, the officers
took  her  back  to  the  booking  area,  still  in  handcuffs.   (See R., pp.129-30; Defense Exhibit A;
State’s Exhibit 3.)  Sometime later, a video camera shows Ms. Ibarra throw something across the
room.  (State’s Exhibit 3.)  Officers located the item, seized it, searched it, and found a wrapped-
up plastic container.  (See State’s Exhibits 1-2; Tr., Vol.1, p.16, L.11 - p.17, L.13.)  The plastic
container tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.17, Ls.15-20.)  As a
result, Ms. Ibarra was charged with possession of contraband in a jail (Docket Number 44949,
hereinafter, the “contraband” case).
Ms. Ibarra moved to suppress the evidence found in the plastic container.  (R., p.121.)
She argued that incarcerated persons retain some level of a right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, a right which is balanced against the reasonableness of officers’ intrusions into that
privacy.    (R.,  p.109.)   She  explained  that,  once  the  strip  search  occurred,  her  body waste  was
examined, and the officers found no contraband, they no longer had probable cause to continue
restraining her.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.37, Ls.18-23.)  She also argued that, even if they had tried, the
officers could not have actually secured a warrant from a magistrate at that point.  (Tr., Vol.1,
5 Ms. Ibarra moved to suppress her statements from that interrogation because of the violation of
her right to speak to an attorney.  (R., p.121.)  The prosecutor did not contest that aspect of her
motion.  (R., pp.138-39)  As such, the district court granted that aspect of her motion.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.4, Ls.5-10.)
5p.37, L.18 - p.38, L.20.)  Thus, the continued detention was illegal, and therefore, the plastic
container should be suppressed even though she had discarded it.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.38, Ls.5-17.)
The  district  court  concluded  the  officers’  actions  were  reasonable  because  of  the  jail’s
interest in dealing with contraband.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.40, L.22 - p.41, L.1.)  It also concluded
“that the property seeking to be suppressed was not found as a result of a search but rather as a
result I assume of a detention for two and a half hours and then property that was discarded on
the floor. . . . [I]t’s abandoned.”  (Tr., Vol.1, p.41, Ls.2-6.)  As a result, it denied her motion to
suppress the evidence from the plastic container.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.41, Ls.6-7.)6
Ms. Ibarra subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea in which she reserved her right
to appeal that decision.  (R., pp.164-65; Tr., Vol.2, p.4, Ls.16-24.)  As a result, she pled guilty to
one count of possession of a controlled substance in the possession case and one count
possession of contraband in prisons in the contraband case.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.3, L.21 - p.4, L.1.)
She also agreed to pay restitution for all the lab testing in both cases and reimbursement for her
public  defender.   (Tr.,  Vol.2,  p.4,  Ls.2-10.)   In  exchange,  the  State  agreed  to  dismiss  various
other charges and sentencing enhancements.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.4, Ls.11-15.)
At the sentencing hearing, the parties acknowledged that Ms. Ibarra was still subject to a
unified sentence of nineteen years, with six and one-half years fixed, in an unrelated case.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.17, Ls.9-22.)  The State recommended the district court impose a concurrent
twelve-year aggregate sentence in these cases, consisting of a seven-year sentence, all fixed, in
the possession case, followed by a consecutive five-year sentence, all indeterminate, in the
contraband case.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.21, Ls.12-21.)
6 The district court did not enter a written order in regard to the motion to suppress.  (See
generally R.)
6Defense counsel noted Ms. Ibarra was still relatively young and had begun taking steps
toward rehabilitation.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.23, Ls.8-23, p.24, Ls.16-23.)  He explained it should be
quickly apparent whether Ms. Ibarra was serious about pursuing those changes, and so, the
addition of six months of fixed time called for by the State’s requested sentence would not really
serve the goals of sentencing.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.26, L.7 - p.27, L.8.)  Rather, he recommended the
district court impose, concurrent with her sentence from the other case, an aggregate sentence of
six and one-half years in these cases, consisting of a six and one-half year sentence, with three
years fixed, in the possession case and a concurrent five-year sentence, all indeterminate, in the
contraband case.   (Tr.,  Vol.3,  p.25,  L.21  -  p.26,  L.6.)   The  district  court  imposed  the  sentence
recommended by the State.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.30, Ls.10-16.)
Ms. Ibarra filed timely notices of appeal from the judgments of conviction in both cases.
(R., pp.34, 43, 187, 197.)
7ISSUES
I. Whether the district court erred by denying Ms. Ibarra’s motion to suppress in the
contraband case.
II. Whether the district court abused its discretion in both cases by imposing excessive
sentences on Ms. Ibarra.
8ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Ibarra’s Motion To Suppress In The Contraband Case
A. Standard Of Review
The standard of review in regard to motions to suppress is bifurcated. State v. Ross, 160
Idaho 757, 759 (Ct. App. 2016).  The appellate court defers to the factual findings made by the
district court which are supported by substantial evidence, but reviews questions of law de novo.
Id.
B. The District Court Should Have Suppressed The Evidence From The Plastic Container
Because Ms. Ibarra Discarded It While She Was Subjected To Unlawful Police Conduct
A person usually does not retain a privacy interest in an item which she discards prior to
being seized herself, and so, in those cases, she may not challenge the seizure and subsequent
search of those items. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991);
State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 437 (Ct. App. 2006).  “If the abandonment is caused by illegal
police conduct, however, the abandonment is not voluntary.” State v. Harwood, 133 Idaho 50,
52 (Ct. App. 1999); accord Ross, 160 Idaho at 759-60.  In that latter scenario, “the defendant’s
actions were not truly their own, but were coerced and precipitated by the illegal police
conduct.” State v. Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 550 (Ct. App. 2000).  As a result, in that latter
scenario, the defendant retains her ability to challenge the seizure and subsequent search of the
evidence in question even though she might otherwise have been said to have abandoned it.
See, e.g., Ross, 160 Idaho at 760.
Thus, in Ross,  the  defendant  was  able  to  challenge  the  officers’  search  of  a  duffle  bag
even though he had disclaimed ownership of the bag because the officers had unlawfully seized
9the duffle bag prior to his disclaimer of ownership. Id.  His “abandonment was not voluntary
and, therefore, did not divest him of standing to challenge the search of the duffle bag” because
the officers were still actively engaged in the search for evidence at the time he disclaimed
ownership of the duffle bag. Id.  As a result, the fruits of the subsequent search of the duffle bag
should have been suppressed. Id.
Schrecengost illustrates the contrasting scenario.  In that case, the defendant was
unlawfully arrested without probable cause and strip searched at the jail. Schrecengost, 134
Idaho at 548.  The officer found and seized several baggies during that strip search. Id.
Thereafter, while the officer was distracted, the defendant took back the baggies and tried to
flush them down a toilet. Id.  The Court of Appeals held that, because the baggies had been
taken from the defendant’s possession and the officers were no longer actively searching for
evidence at the time the defendant discarded the evidence, her act of discarding the baggies was
sufficiently separate from the illegal arrest, such that the State could use that evidence while
prosecuting a new charge of destruction of evidence.7 Id. at 550.
This case is more like Ross than Schrecengost because, as will be discussed in detail,
infra, at the time Ms. Ibarra discarded the plastic container, the officers were unlawfully
restraining her, they were continuing to search for evidence, and the item in question had not yet
been seized from Ms. Ibarra.  Additionally, the district court acknowledged Ms. Ibarra’s decision
to discard the container was caused by the continuing detention:  “the property seeking to be
suppressed was not found as a result of a search but rather as a result I assume of a detention for
7 The Schrecengost Court did not express any opinion as to whether the State could have used
the evidence from the baggies in other prosecutions where the seizure and search of those
baggies  was  more  directly  related  to  the  unlawful  arrest,  such  as  in  regard  to  her  original
possession of the controlled substances in the baggies. Schrecengost, 134 Idaho at 550 n.4.
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two and a half hours and then property that was discarded on the floor.”  (Tr., Vol.1, p.41,
Ls.2-6.)  Therefore, if that detention was unlawful, and if Ms. Ibarra retained a privacy interest at
that time, her discarding of the plastic container would be caused by the unlawful police conduct,
and  so,  would  not  have  been  voluntary. Compare Ross,  160  Idaho  at  760.   In  that  case,
Ms. Ibarra would still be able to challenge the seizure and subsequent search of the plastic
container.
1. Ms. Ibarra retained a right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment despite being
incarcerated
“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); accord Sivak v. State, 111 Idaho 118,
120 (Ct. App. 1986).  One of the rights which incarcerated persons retain is the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of
County of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 327 (2012); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979);
see generally U.S. CONST. amend IV.  However, the understanding of what is and is not
reasonable is different inside a penal institution than in the community at large.  For example,
because of the issues inherent in jail administration, an inmate’s right to privacy must “always
yield to what must be considered the paramount interest in institutional security.”
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984) (finding searches of an inmate’s cell to be
reasonable).
As such, “correctional officers must be permitted to devise reasonable search policies to
detect and deter the possession of contraband in facilities.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 328 (emphasis
added).   However,  just  because  one  search  might  be  reasonable  in  the  circumstances  of  a
particular case, that does not necessarily mean all such searches are automatically reasonable.
11
Id. at 338-39; see id. at 340 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“it is important to me that the Court does
not foreclose the possibility of an exception to the rule it announces.”); id. at 340-41 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (noting that the lead opinion had not addressed whether the search it had found
reasonable in that case would always be reasonable, and “[i]n light of that limitation, I join the
opinion of the Court in full”).  Thus, the determination of whether a correctional officer’s actions
are reasonable in a given circumstance is determined by evaluating the totality of the
circumstances, which necessarily includes the realities of incarceration. See id. at 327 (“There is
no mechanical way to determine whether intrusions on an inmate’s privacy are reasonable.  The
need for a particular search must be balanced against the resulting invasion of personal rights.”)
(citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559)
The United States Supreme Court has provided guidance on how to determine whether a
search for contraband is reasonable:  “in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to
indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations [such as
locating contraband,] courts should ordinarily defer to [prison administrators’] expert judgment
in such matters.” Id. at 328 (internal quotation omitted).  That said, “[w]e do not underestimate
the degree to which these searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates.” Bell, 441
U.S. at 560.  As such, there are legitimate concerns that prison officials may go too far in
searching for contraband, that there may be “instances of officers engaging in intentional
humiliation and other abusive practices.  There may also be legitimate concerns about the
invasiveness of searches involving the touching of detainees.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 339.  “Such
an abuse cannot be condoned.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.
The totality of the circumstances in this case reveal that, at the time Ms. Ibarra discarded
the plastic container, the officers had exaggerated their response beyond what was reasonable.
12
As the officer admitted at the suppression hearing, they had done everything they could without a
warrant.  (See Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.8-12.)  They had strip searched Ms. Ibarra when she first
arrived at the jail.  (R., pp.126-27.)  That search included having her squat and cough.
(R., p.127.)  It also included having a canine sniff her.  (R., p.126.)  They had searched her cell,
which included a second canine sniff.  (R., p.127.)  On the day in question, they conducted a
second strip search of her person.  (R., pp.127-28; Tr., Vol.1 p.26, Ls.7-9.)  They only allowed
her to go to the bathroom under supervision and then examined her waste.  (R., p.129.)  During
each of the searches, officers did not find any contraband in Ms. Ibarra’s possession.
(R., pp.126-29.)  Thus, they had done everything they were reasonably allowed to do, and so, by
continuing to restrain her in order to go further, beyond what was reasonable, they exaggerated
their response.
Exemplifying the exaggerated nature of their response, the officers subjected Ms. Ibarra
to an unlawful interrogation after she invoked her Fifth Amendment right to counsel.  (See
R., pp.129, 138-39.)  In that interrogation, they threatened to get a warrant that they likely could
not have gotten at that point.  (See Section I(B)(2), infra (detailing why, at that point, officers did
not have made a showing of probable cause to a magistrate).)  After conducting that unlawful
interrogation, they continued to keep Ms. Ibarra handcuffed in the booking area in a way which
aggravated the documented issues with her back.  (R., pp.127-28.)
The exaggerated nature of these responses is particularly evident when they are compared
with the officers’ responses after not finding any contraband on the other two suspects.  Unlike
Ms. Ibarra, they were allowed to use a proper toilet and were allowed to simply return to their
cells, apparently not restrained further, when the searches failed to reveal contraband.
(See R., pp.127-28.)  Since the officers’ responses in Ms. Ibarra’s case were not reasonable under
13
Florence and Bell, they were infringing on a recognizable privacy interest at that time she
discarded the plastic container.
Put another way, Ms. Ibarra’s rights yielded to the reasonable interests of the jail.  When
the officers found nothing during their reasonable intrusions, there was no longer an objectively-
reasonable basis to continue intruding upon her rights. Cf. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 662
(2007) (holding that, where an officer has patted down a suspect and has no lingering,
objectively-reasonable concerns about his safety, an ensuing warrantless search will be
unconstitutional because the frisk had adequately addressed the reasonable concerns).  Once the
reasonable interests of the jail had been addressed, there was no longer a reason for Ms. Ibarra’s
rights to yield.  As a result, Ms. Ibarra retained a privacy interest at the point the officers
continued to restrain her after they had already reasonably addressed the jail’s interests.
2. The continuing restriction of Ms. Ibarra’s liberty was unlawful
Certainly, corrections officers can further restrict the already-limited liberty of inmates
when circumstances justify it. See, e.g., Hudson, 468 U.S. at 528.  However, when it comes to
pre-trial detainees like Ms. Ibarra, the due process clause prevents them from being “punished”
in a constitutional sense because there has been no adjudication of their guilt at that point in time.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 535; see generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  As a result, a further restriction of
the already-limited liberty of a pretrial detainee will be unlawful if it amounts to “punishment.”
Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39.
The Bell Court provided guidance for evaluating whether a particular restriction of a
pretrial detainee’s liberty amounts to unconstitutional punishment:  “if a particular condition or
restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it
does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Id. at 539.  “Conversely, if a restriction is not
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reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary and purposeless—a court may
permissibly infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not be
constitutionally inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.” Id.; accord Mallery v. Lewis, 106 Idaho
227, 230 (1983).  For example:
[L]oading a detainee with chains and shackles and throwing him in a dungeon
may ensure his presence at trial and preserve the security of the institution.  But it
would be difficult to conceive of a situation where conditions so harsh, employed
to achieve objectives that could be accomplished in so many alternate and less
harsh methods, would not support a conclusion that the purpose for which they
were imposed was to punish.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20.
As discussed in Section I(B)(1), supra, the legitimate goal of locating contraband had
already been reasonably addressed by the various searches, including dog sniffs, of Ms. Ibarra’s
person and cell.  In fact, her situation after the searches of her person and body waste on the day
in question echoes the untenable scenario from Bell, where the detainee is loaded with chains and
shackles, as the officers continued to keep Ms. Ibarra handcuffed in a manner which aggravated
her back issues.  (R., pp.127-28.)  She was also subjected to an unlawful interrogation in
violation of her Fifth Amendment right to an attorney.  (See R., pp.129, 138-39.)  Even before
that point, the officers had been acting unreasonably toward Ms. Ibarra, first denying her request
to use the bathroom outright, then only allowing her to go in a biohazard bag rather than in a
proper toilet.  (R., p.129.)
The arbitrariness of those actions is evident from the way the officers handled the two
other inmates who were also suspected of possessing the contraband in question.  When the other
two inmates asked, they were not only allowed to go to the bathroom, but were also allowed to
use a proper toilet, though the plumbing was turned off as a precaution against disposal of
evidence.  (See R., p.128.)  Furthermore, when officers found no contraband after strip searching
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the other two, they were allowed to return to their cells, apparently not further restrained.
(See R., p.128.)  Thus, there were alternative, less harsh methods available to the officers, which
means  the  officers’  actions  toward  Ms.  Ibarra  were  arbitrary  and  amount  to  unconstitutional
punishment of a pretrial detainee.
Furthermore, the continued restraint of Ms. Ibarra’s liberty was purposeless because,
despite the officer’s threat, they could not have gotten a search warrant for a body cavity search
at that point.  In fact, there is no indication that the officers were actually trying to get such a
warrant.  (See generally R., Tr., Vol.1.)  Rather, the evidence presented in regard to the motion to
suppress only shows that the officer told Ms. Ibarra they could seek a warrant in an apparent
effort to elicit an admission, including during an unlawful interrogation.  (R., p.128; see Defense
Exhibit  A.)   Thus,  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  purpose  of  continuing  to  restrain  Ms.  Ibarra’s
liberty was actually to secure a warrant, as opposed to “punishing” her for not cooperating with
their investigation.8
Even if seeking a warrant was their purpose, it was not a legitimate basis to justify the
prolonged restraint because the officers did not have probable cause to justify that detention. See
State v. Kapelle, 158 Idaho 121, 129 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting that officers could have detained
the defendant to preserve the status quo while they sought a search warrant specifically because
they had probable cause from smelling raw marijuana upon entering the house); but see
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980) (“We can assume . . . that the police violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by detaining petitioner and his companions in the house
8 Warrantless seizures of a person are presumptively unreasonable. See, e.g., Halen v. State, 136
Idaho 829, 833 (2002).  As such, the State bears the burden of proving that the officers’ actions
fall within one of the limited, well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id.  Thus,
the lack of evidence in the record before the district court weighs in favor of granting the motion
to suppress because it means the State failed to carry its burden.
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while they obtained a search warrant for the premises” even though they had smelled marijuana
smoke upon entering the house).  That lack of probable cause also made it unlikely, given the
evidence presented in regard to the motion to suppress, that the officers could have actually
gotten a search warrant at that time.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.37, L.18 - p.38, L.20; see also Tr., Vol.1,
p.11, Ls.3-20 (defense counsel discussing problems with the informant’s veracity).)
Specifically, warrants are not properly issued based on informant tips, even if the
informant is known, when the officers have conducted a follow-up investigation and failed to
corroborate the tip. See, e.g., State v. Chapple, 124 Idaho 525, 530 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding
there was insufficient corroboration of a known confidential informant’s tip, and so, the evidence
properly before the magistrate failed to establish probable cause to justify issuing a search
warrant); see also State v. Turpin, 129 Idaho 748, 750-51 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that, where
the officers’ investigation had not sufficiently corroborated an informant’s tip, the officers had
failed to establish probable cause to justify issuing a search warrant).  Here, the officers did
everything they could reasonably do without a warrant and found no evidence of contraband.
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.27, L.8-12.)  Rather than blooming into probable cause, the reasonable
suspicion gained by the informant’s tip in this case dissipated. See, e.g., Florence, 566 U.S. at
339 (noting that limits exist on officers’ ability to search incarcerated persons); Bell, 441 U.S. at
560 (same).  As such, the officers could not have made a sufficient showing to establish probable
cause to a magistrate when their follow-up searches had not corroborated the informant’s tip.
Because the officers no longer had probable cause, the continued restriction of
Ms. Ibarra’s already-limited liberty was not reasonably related to a legitimate goal.  Rather,
especially when contrasted against the officers’ actions with the other two inmates they also
suspected of possessing contraband, the officers’ actions in this case were arbitrary and
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purposeless, and thus, amounted to unconstitutional punishment of a pretrial detainee.  By going
beyond what was reasonable, these actions amount to the type of abuses which the United States
Supreme Court has held “cannot be condoned.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.  Therefore, continuing to
restrain Ms. Ibarra after officers had reasonably addressed the legitimate governmental interest
was unlawful.
3. Conclusion
Because Ms. Ibarra had a right to privacy and the continuing restraint of her liberty was
unlawful at the time she abandoned the plastic container, her abandonment of that container was
not voluntary. See Ross, 160 Idaho at 760.  Therefore, she can challenge the seizure and search
of that container and the fruits of the illegal search should have been suppressed. Id.; accord
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).  As a result, this Court should reverse the
order denying her motion to suppress that evidence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Both Cases By Imposing Excessive Sentences On
Ms. Ibarra
A. Standard Of Review
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982).  Accordingly, in order
to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision, he must show that, in
light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts.
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997).  The district court abuses its discretion if it does not
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appreciate the decision as one within its discretion, if it does not act within the outer bounds of
that discretion or inconsistent with the applicable legal principles, or if it does not reach its
decision in an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:  (1) protection of society;
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.   The  protection  of  society  is  the  primary
objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
Therefore, a sentence which protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be
considered reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).  This is
because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result,
each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.  However,
the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that rehabilitation is the first means the district court
should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded
on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
B. A Sufficient Consideration Of The Mitigating Factors Reveals That Concurrent, Shorter
Sentences Would Better Serve The Goals Of Sentencing In Ms. Ibarra’s Cases
In these cases, the district court did not reach its sentencing decision in an exercise of
reason, as it failed to sufficiently consider the various mitigating factors, and thus, imposed
sentences which failed to serve all the goals of sentence.  Specifically, there are two aspects of
the imposed sentences which are flawed:  the seven-year fixed term in the possession case is
excessive, and the decision to make the five-year sentence in the contraband case consecutive to
the sentence in the possession case is excessive.
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As trial counsel pointed out, Ms. Ibarra was beginning to make efforts at rehabilitation,
and it would become clear relatively quickly how serious she was about continuing those efforts.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.1.)  Therefore, he argued the district court could promote the
goal of rehabilitation by imposing a sentence that would not hamper her potential release from
custody if she continued those efforts at rehabilitation after the six and one-half years she would
be serving because of her other case.  (See Tr., Vol.3, p.26, L.25 - p.27, L.8.)  Sentences are to be
crafted so they do not force the prison system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation
or age has decreased the risk of recidivism. State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App.
1988).
Specifically, Ms. Ibarra’s efforts at rehabilitation are evidenced by her expressing
remorse, accepting responsibly for her actions, and acknowledging the need for consequences to
result from them.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.27, L.11, p.28, Ls.1-2.)  These are critical first steps toward
rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010).  Furthermore, she
agreed, as part of the plea agreement, to pay restitution for the lab costs in this case, as well as
reimbursement for the public defender costs.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.4, Ls.2-10; Tr., Vol.3, p.22,
Ls.17-23.)  Willingness to pay restitution is another factor which should be considered in
mitigation.   I.C. § 19-2521(2)(f); State v. Hall, 114 Idaho 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1988).
Additionally,  trial  counsel  pointed  out  Ms.  Ibarra  is  still  relatively  young.   (Tr.,  Vol.3,
p.23, Ls.8-23; see PSI, p.1 (noting Ms. Ibarra was 31 years old at that time).)  When a defendant
is still young, her age is a factor which weighs in mitigation because it speaks significantly to her
rehabilitative potential.  State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho
482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639.  A younger offender should be treated
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more leniently because she is still maturing, and still able to become a productive member of
society. See, e.g., State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126 (1980).
Ms. Ibarra’s rehabilitative potential is further demonstrated by the continuing support
from  her  mother.   (See Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,  PSI),  p.14.)   Family
constitutes an important part of a support network, which can help in rehabilitation. See Kellis,
148 Idaho at 817 (holding that familial support offered to affirm the defendant’s innocence does
not equate to familial support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the
support been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration).
Trial  counsel  also  explained  that  Ms.  Ibarra’s  prior  history,  particularly  of  disciplinary  reports
while in custody, (see PSI, pp.7-12), was a product of her poor choices in terms of associates.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.24, Ls.3-15.)  However, she has begun to realize the role those decisions have
played and started to address them since being incarcerated in these cases.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.24,
Ls.16-23.)
Ms.  Ibarra  also  expressed  a  desire  to  achieve  and  maintain  her  sobriety.   (PSI,  p.20;
Tr., Vol.3, p.28, Ls.22-23.)  To that point, she noted that she was able to successfully participate
in drug court for over a year back in 2006.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.28, Ls.2-9.)  Such amenability to
treatment should also be considered as a mitigating factor. See, e.g., State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho
204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
As a result of all these mitigating factors, trial counsel explained that adding six months
of  fixed  time  to  Ms.  Ibarra’s  overall  term  of  incarceration  would  not  really  serve  the  goals  of
sentencing.  (Tr., Vol.3, p.27, Ls.4-8.)  Rather, taking her rehabilitative potential into account,
allowing her to demonstrate her dedication to continue working toward that goal and leave it to
the parole board to decide whether she should be released at the end of the six and one-half years
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she would be obligated to serve regardless would better serve all the goals of sentencing.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.26, L.25 - p.27, L.8.)
As a result, the district court’s decision to impose a seven-year sentence, all fixed, in the
possession case, rather than the six and one-half year sentence, with three years fixed, requested
by trial counsel, fails to serve all the goals of sentencing, particularly the goal which the Idaho
Supreme Court has indicated should be the first means considered to achieve protection of
society.  Similarly, its decision to run the five-year indeterminate sentence for the contraband
case consecutive to the sentence in the possession case, rather than, as trial counsel requested,
concurrent with the other sentences, fails to adequately consider the mitigating factors, and so, is
excessive.  Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in both those aspects of its
sentencing decision.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Ibarra respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision denying her motion to
suppress in the contraband case.  She also respectfully requests this Court reduce both her
sentences as it deems appropriate, or alternatively, remand these cases for a new sentencing
hearing.
DATED this 5th day of December, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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